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ROSSIAN MORAL PLURALISM: A (PARTIAL) DEFENSE 
by 
ANGELA J DESAULNIERS 
Under the Direction of Andrew Altman 
ABSTRACT 
 
Rossian moral pluralism’s rejection of a founding moral principle and use of ‘prima facie 
duties’ as opposed to absolute duties makes it unique from most other major ethical 
theories.  It has been attacked in a myriad of different ways because of this.  Brad Hooker 
has proposed two objections based on these ideas.  The first is that moral pluralism is 
lacking justification because of its rejection of a founding moral principle.  The second is 
that because of this, and its lack of absolute duties, moral pluralism is an indeterminate 
theory.  In this paper I will look at Hooker’s objections as well as two responses that have 
been proposed as solutions.  Having shown these solutions to be insufficient I will then 
propose a way to look at Ross’ moral pluralism that saves it from Hooker’s objections 
and clearly lays out Ross’ understanding of how we should deliberate about moral 
matters. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION:
 
Instructions on how to live ‘a good life’ have been sought after since well before 
the time of Plato.  Ethicists have been dissecting the way we live as well as the way we 
think we should be living in the hope of finding something to base our moral decisions 
on.  The vast majority of theories have been constructed with the thought in mind that 
every decision we make must eventually rely on one and only one principle.  What this 
principle is has been the main point of contention.  Some have thought that it should be 
our goal in every action that we attempt to produce as much happiness as possible 
(Utilitarianism).1  Others have thought that the production of our own virtue was what we 
should strive towards (Aristotelian Virtue Ethics).2  Still others have thought that we 
should do actions which it is our duty to do (Kantian Deontology).3  Unfortunately many 
problems have been found with each of these theories and a set of clear, consistent, and 
determinate instructions for humans to live by, based on a single underlying principle, 
has continued to elude ethicists.   
One idea that has not been seriously considered by many is that it is possible that 
our moral inclinations are not monist and founded in one singular moral principle, but 
pluralistic and founded in many moral principles.  A theorist who has taken this idea 
seriously is W.D. Ross.  In his book, The Right and the Good, Ross outlines a pluralist 
                                                
1 See Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (New York: Hafner), 
1948, or John Stewart Mill’s Utilitarianism, (Indianapolis: Hackett), 1979. 
2 See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
3 See Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphysics of Morals. 
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view of morality and attempts to ground our moral decisions in not just one principle but 
many. 
This pluralist way of looking at moral theory has sparked both interest and 
criticism from many theorists.  For example, in “Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-
consequentialism”, Brad Hooker raises many criticisms against Ross’ theory as well as 
the general idea of a pluralistic moral theory.  Many responses have been attempted to 
combat such criticisms but none of them have been able to successfully refute all of the 
seemingly damning arguments that Hooker makes against Ross and his pluralism.   
In this paper I will attempt to defend Ross against the objections presented by 
Hooker.  I will first lay out Ross’ moral pluralism and the general objections to his 
theory.  I will then present the specific objections raised by Hooker to Rossian moral 
pluralism as well as their effect on the theory if they cannot be refuted.  Then I will 
critically examine two recent responses to Hooker’s objections and show how they fail to 
adequately defend Ross.  Finally I will present a defense of Ross’ moral pluralism against 
the objections raised by Hooker that, at the end of the day, will place Ross’ theory in a 
more favorable light and save it from its potential demise at the hands of the objections 
raised against it. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: ROSSIAN MORAL PLURALISM 
 
 
Ross’ Attempt at a ‘New’ Moral Theory 
 
 W.D. Ross constructed most of his moral pluralism in The Right and the Good.  
He was prompted to draw out a pluralistic ethical theory after previous careful 
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examinations of the many monist theories already in existence.  To Ross, it seemed as if 
none of those theories had ever been able to fully grasp the grounds on which we make 
decisions about how we should act in any given situation.  After its initial publication 
there were many questions and objections to the specifications and distinctions he drew, 
so he was prompted to publish a second piece clarifying his initial observations.  In 
Foundations of Ethics, Ross answered many of the initial questions people had regarding 
moral pluralism.  These questions were raised mainly because up until this point the idea 
of there being any alternative to a monistic moral theory had been foreign to most 
theorists.  
 Unfortunately for Ross his theory never gained the same strength and importance 
in the eyes of ethical theorists as previous theories had been able to.  The reason for this 
seems to be that his theory relies on a theory that was ‘refuted’ and then never taken 
seriously again until recently: intuitionism.  While whether or not we can rely on our 
intuitions to make moral judgments is once again an active philosophical question, it is 
outside the scope of my project.  Many philosophers have now agreed with Ross and do 
feel that we can rely on intuitions for many things, including moral judgments.  For 
purposes of this paper, I will be assuming that intuitions can be relied on and that we are 
justified in using them to construct a moral theory. 
 
The Idea Behind the Theory 
 
 In developing his moral theory, Ross aimed at finding a way to ground our moral 
decisions in something other than just one small aspect of each action we take.  He, like 
many other philosophers, felt that monistic theories were “overly reductive: they attempt 
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to boil all morally relevant considerations down to a single, fundamental feature 
possessed of moral relevance.”4  When we reason about a situation, according to Ross, 
we generally take more into account about the situation than just whether it produces 
pleasing consequences or if we have an absolute duty to keep our promises.  If we were 
to take into account only one of these aspects we seem to lose something because 
“normally promise keeping…should come before benevolence, but…when and only 
when the good to be produced by the benevolent act is very great and the promise 
comparatively trivial, the act of benevolence becomes our duty.”5  There must be a way 
to keep both of these ideas, as well as any others that we may find necessary, in mind 
when we need to decide which course of action to take.   
For Ross, the way to find all of the relevant considerations is by looking at the 
relationships we have with people.  While a beneficiary relationship with others is one of 
the most common types of relationships that we are in, it is not the only relationship we 
have.  Others “do stand in this relationship to me, and this relation is morally significant.  
But they may also stand to me in the relation of promisee to promiser, of creditor to 
debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow countryman to 
fellow countryman, and the like.”6  Each of these relationships needs to be reflected in 
the moral theory that we use to make our decisions.  If we leave them out, then we leave 
out the majority of the considerations we normally take into account when we are making 
a decision to take a certain action.  Whether these considerations can be acted on, and 
                                                
4 Timmons p.190. 
5 Ross 1946 p. 19. 
6 Ross 1946 p. 19. 
 5 
how I can act on them if I am allowed to is something for the moral theory we use to 
decide.  As we will see soon, Ross creates his theory so that we can respect these 
relationships we have with people. 
 While the first goal of Ross’ theory is to create a theory that reflects our intuitions 
and normal decision making process, a secondary goal in this process was to ensure that 
the theory truly reflect our intuitions and therefore not be grounded in any one moral 
principle.  Any attempt to ground the theory in a singular moral principle, according to 
Ross, will and should fail.  We need to look at something other than what a potential 
single underlying principle would be.  According to Ross, because of the varying 
relationships that we have with people, as well as the varying situations we can be 
confronted with, all that we can truly rely on are the intuitions we have or our ‘common-
sense morality’.  Anyone who is has “reached sufficient mental maturity and ha[s] given 
sufficient attention to the proposition” 7 will be able to rightly decide which courses of 
action are right and wrong if they have the correct system with which to do so.  The one 
and only way to figure out what to do is to look at the entirety of the situation one is in 
and look at the relationships (and as we will see soon the duties that come out of these 
relationships) one is in.  In doing this, the right action will always be evident to the 
rational, adult mind. 
The first problem that comes to mind with this idea of a ‘common-sense’ morality 
is that it seems that we cannot always rely on our own common-sense because there are 
times when our convictions fail us in some way and lead us in the wrong direction.  What 
                                                
7 Ross 1946 p.29. 
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we need to keep in mind though is that Ross is not telling us to adopt our common-sense 
convictions solely as they are but tells us, as Berys Gaut puts it, that “when we begin 
critical thinking about morality…we start with a rich set of convictions and begin to 
reflect on these convictions with the tools we have available: the principles of 
deliberation internal to that morality, the convictions themselves and our experience of 
the world.”8  When we engage in this rational deliberation and look at what our common-
sense morality has told us, we can decide if it does in fact correctly reflect the way the 
world is.  Even if our initial intuitions about the world were incorrect, through this 
process we can develop correct intuitions so that we can understand what is morally right 
and also what is morally good. 
 
Morally Right vs. Morally Good 
 
 As can be expected from the title of his book, Ross is concerned with something 
more than just the outlining of a new moral theory.  His main project within The Right 
and the Good is to explain the difference between something’s being morally right and its 
being morally good.  While I am not going to go into as full detail as Ross has, I do feel 
that it is necessary to look at the distinction between the two terms.  This classification 
may prove to be useful when we look later on at the objections to Ross’ theory. 
 While some theorists have held that there is no difference between what is 
morally right and what is morally good, Ross believes that these are two very distinct 
ideas.  Ross holds that the term ‘morally right’ is almost synonymous with ‘morally 
obligatory’.  He states that the term ‘right act’ refers to a “change in the state of affairs 
                                                
8 Gaut 1999 p.34. 
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irrespective of motive.”9  Whether an act is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ solely depends on the 
intrinsic nature of the act.  Regardless of our motives, we will still be doing the right act 
if it is the act that is morally obligatory at that time.  If it is morally obligatory then it will 
be a morally right act; if it is morally forbidden then it will be a morally wrong act.  This 
act will either be condoned or forbidden based solely on its nature and not on anything to 
do with the consequences of the act or the motives from which the act is done.  If it is in 
the nature of a certain act to bring about a certain state of affairs then it is a right act 
solely in its production of that state of affairs and not in what it specifically produces.  
Take, for example, the duty to keep a promise to pick a friend up from the airport (later, 
in the section on Prima Facie Duties, we will see more about how one could be held to 
act according to this duty).  If one does in fact pick their friend up at the airport, it is not 
the consequences of this action (such as your friend not having to take public 
transportation to get home or the solidifying of your friendship, etc.) that make it the right 
action.  What makes it the right action is that it was sufficient to fulfill the promise that 
had been made.  What actually comes from the action is irrelevant to the rightness or 
wrongness of the action.  Ross states “an act is not right because it, being one thing, 
produces good results different from itself; it is right because it is itself the production of 
a certain state of affairs.  Such production is right in itself, apart from any 
consequences”10. 
 The question of whether or not the doing of an action is morally good is, 
according to Ross, a different question altogether.  While “right and wrong refer entirely 
                                                
9 Ross 1946 p.6-7. 
10 Ross 1946 p. 46-47. 
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to the thing done, morally good and morally bad [refer] entirely to the motive from which 
it is done.”11  This means that it is possible for an act to be morally right but, at the same 
time, morally bad because it does not come from good motives.  This also means that 
even if we do the morally right action, it will have no intrinsic value if it is not done from 
good motives and is not morally good.  For example, if we were to make and keep a 
promise to a friend simply because we know we will benefit in the end, we are doing the 
act from selfish motivations and the act is no longer morally good.  Alternatively, if we 
make a keep a promise to a friend because they are our friend and we have a genuine 
desire to do this because of our friendship with them, we are acting from altruistic 
motivations and the act is morally good.   
Ross admits to his reader that he knows it is impossible to create a good motive to 
do an act if it is not immediately present.  His solution is to say that “I can act from a 
certain motive only if I have the motive; if not the most I can do is cultivate it…so that on 
some future occasion it will be present to me and I shall be able to act from it.”12  This 
idea of cultivating good motives goes hand in hand with what it means for something to 
be a ‘good’ motive for Ross.  For an act to come from good motives means that it is done 
from a sense of duty or one of the other senses which are intrinsically good.  If it is the 
case that one does not have the correct motivations for doing an act, then, over time, a 
person can cultivate these motivations within themselves by doing what is morally right 
and promoting things that are intrinsically good.  Eventually the intrinsically good 
                                                
11 Ross 1946 p. 7. 
12 Ross 1946 p. 5. 
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motivations will realize and develop themselves and one will be able to do morally good 
actions. 
 
Intrinsic Goods 
 
 Now that we see their role in Ross’ theory it will definitely help to know what 
exactly he thinks can be an intrinsic good.  What it means for something to be 
intrinsically good is that “it would be good even if nothing else existed.”13  There are four 
things like this.  In order to find them he takes a look at the idea of a world devoid of 
everything, except the quality in consideration.  If the existence of the quality in a world 
would make that world a better or more desirable state of affairs, then the quality in 
question is an intrinsic good.   
 The first quality Ross finds to be intrinsically good is the characteristic of being 
virtuous.  He explains this as an “action, or disposition to act, from any one of certain 
motives, of which at all events the most notable are the desire to do one’s duty, the desire 
to bring into being something that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to 
others.”14  A state of affairs in which virtue existed would be much more desirable than 
one in which it did not.  Any action that comes from this motive will be a morally good 
action regardless of the consequences.  Whether it is a morally right act or not, though, 
will depend on the nature of the act and whether or not you had a higher duty to perform 
some other act, something we will come to in the next section. 
                                                
13 Ross 1946 p. 75. 
14 Ross 1946 p. 134. 
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 The second quality that is intrinsically good is “the apportionment of pleasure and 
pain to the virtuous and vicious respectively”15.  Any world in which those who acted 
virtuously received benefits such as pleasure would be better than one in which they were 
the victims of pain.  Ross believes this is an intrinsic good not only because of the fact 
that a world with it would be better than a world without it, but also because we seem to 
have some sort of natural inclination toward justice, toward seeing that those who do 
morally good things receive benefits in life rather than have benefits taken from them.  
We do not think this is an agreeable state of affairs because of the consequences of the 
virtuous receiving pleasures but because there seems to be something wrong with the idea 
of those who act from a sense of duty or one of the other virtuous dispositions, the way 
we all should be acting, having bad things happen to them because of their actions.  A 
world in which there is a question whether a virtuous or non-virtuous person receives an 
available benefit would be better if the virtuous person received the benefit rather than 
the non-virtuous person.  This is what our common-sense morality and intuitions tend to 
tell us. 
 The third quality Ross mentions is knowledge.  Any type of knowledge about 
matters of fact, nature, or universal laws will be a good thing for people to have rather 
than be unaware of or mistaken about.  Ross also tells us that ‘right opinion’ is a better 
state of affairs to have than ‘wrong opinion’.  In comparing two worlds, if one of the 
worlds was a state of affairs in which people had far greater knowledge than the other, we 
can provisionally accept that the world with knowledge would be better than the world 
                                                
15 Ross 1946 p. 138. 
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without knowledge.  I say here, ‘provisionally accept’ because questions will arise about 
situations in which it would be better for a person to not have a piece of information.  
Ross is able to quickly respond to this and say that “it seems that in such cases it is not 
the knowledge but the consequences in the way of pain or vicious action that we think 
bad,”16 vindicating our always attempting to have as much knowledge as possible. 
 The last intrinsic good that Ross believes exists is highly controversial, especially 
in the wake of moral theories such as hedonistic utilitarianism.  For Ross, pleasure is an 
intrinsic good, but an intrinsic good that we have to be very careful with.  He tells us that 
“a state of pleasure has the property, not necessarily of being good, but of being 
something that is good if the state has no other characteristic that prevents it from being 
good.  The two characteristics that may interfere with its being good are (a) that of being 
contrary to desert, and (b) that of being a state which is the realization of a bad 
disposition.”17  He also tells us that there is more than one type of pleasure.  There are the 
obviously good pleasures which are those that come from good desires.  There are bad 
pleasures which come from bad desires.  Last but not least there are indifferent pleasures 
which come from neither of these desires and seem to come from a position of ignorance, 
either intentional or accidental, as to what one should be doing in the situation.  With all 
of these qualifications in mind, Ross goes on to say that we can attempt to produce good 
pleasure but only when it does not conflict with the production of virtue.  In other words, 
while this type of qualified pleasure is an intrinsic good, and comparable to virtue, we 
must try to cultivate virtue over pleasure.  He says, “It seems to me…that no amount of 
                                                
16 Ross 1946 p. 139. 
17 Ross 1946 p. 138. 
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pleasure is equal to any amount of virtue, that in fact virtue belongs to a higher order 
value, beginning at a point higher on the scale of value than that which pleasure ever 
reaches.”18 
 
Prima Facie Duties 
 
 We can now turn to what Ross thinks a practical ethical theory should be.  In our 
examination thus far, the concept of having a duty to perform certain actions has 
appeared several times.  According to Ross, there are a number of duties that we have in 
life besides those which are typically laid out in an ethical theory.  We are told, in most 
ethical theories, that we have an absolute duty to do X.  What X is varies from theory to 
theory but what doesn’t is the idea of an absolute duty.  Absolute duties are duties which 
one must always uphold regardless of the situation.  One is always required to do actions 
which are absolute duties and is not allowed to pick and choose some and not others.  If 
one has an absolute duty to keep promises one must always do so regardless of the 
specific promise made.  In each of the major ethical theories there is an absolute duty 
placed on the follower of that theory to make sure that whatever the theory holds to be 
important is always the main factor in the decision-making process.   
Theories resting on these absolute duties, according to Ross, fail to respect the 
many relationships that we are in with people.  As was mentioned previously, people are 
not just in a beneficiary relationship with us but also those of a parent, friend, employee, 
etc.  These relationships put duties on us that other theories seem to ignore but that Ross 
thinks are absolutely necessary to creating an ethical theory.  The duties that we have to 
                                                
18 Ross 1946 p. 150. 
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these people are not like absolute duties according to Ross because they are not always 
relevant in a situation and change in their stringency. 
Ross’s answer to the question of what types of duties we have to those we are in 
specific relationships with is to say that we have ‘prima facie’ duties.  “Each of these 
relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more or less incumbent on me 
according to the circumstances of the case.”19  An act that is a prima facie duty has the 
tendency to be our duty in situations.  “It is in fact not a duty, but something related in a 
special way to duty”20 in that it points us towards what can be considered our absolute 
duty in the situation.  For example, in most situations we tend to have the duty to keep 
our promises to people, unless some other duty tells us otherwise.  Another example is 
that we tend to have the duty to help someone, once again, unless some other duty tells us 
otherwise.  That an act is a prima facie duty is, according to Ross, “the 
characteristic…which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind…of being an act 
which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is 
morally significant.”21 
Out of the many relationships that we are in with other people, Ross finds seven 
prima facie duties that are binding on us.  These prima facie duties can be divided into 
two categories; duties of special obligation and value based duties.22  The duties of 
special obligation are the duty of fidelity, the duty of reparation, and the duty of gratitude.  
                                                
19 Ross 1946 p.19. 
20 Ross 1946 p.20. 
21 Ross 1946 p.19. 
22 The names of the categories for the division of the prima facie duties are those of Mark Timmons. 
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They are agent-relative in that they “give different moral aims to different individuals”23 
based on their personal relationships and they exist because of actions I or others have 
taken in the past.  The duty of fidelity is the prima facie duty to keep our promises and 
avoid lying or deceiving people.  The duty of reparation is the prima facie duty to ‘make-
up-for’ wrongs that have been done to people either by you or because of your actions.  
The duty of gratitude is the prima facie duty we have to reciprocate for actions people 
have taken for our benefit in the past.  Whether or not we think someone deserves to have 
their promise kept or for us to make up for some harm we caused them we still have the 
inclination that something would not be right if we were to withhold our actions.  If we 
promise to help someone reap their crops if they will help us with ours but in the time 
between their having helped us and our time to help them we find that they have done 
something we disagree with (for instance hired a slave) we still have the duty to help 
them.  We will see later that there are ways in which our duty to them can be 
overpowered by other duties more stringent than the one already at hand. 
The second category of prima facie duties is that of the value-based duties.  
Value-based duties are distinct from duties of special obligation because value based 
duties are generally agent-neutral “giv[ing] all people the same moral aim”24 regardless 
of their personal situation and relationships and have nothing to do with my or others past 
actions.  The value based duties are the duty of justice, the duty of beneficence, the duty 
of self-improvement, and the duty of non-maleficence.  The duty of justice reflects the 
tendency we have to distribute goods among people according to merit.  They “rest on the 
                                                
23 Brock p. 944. 
24 Brock p.944. 
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fact or possibility of a distribution of pleasure or happiness…which is not in accordance 
with the merit of the persons concerned; in such cases there arises a duty to upset or 
prevent such a distribution.”25  The duty of beneficence simply tells us that there is a 
strong tendency for it to be our duty to do beneficial actions for others.  The duty of self-
improvement tells us that “actions through which we would improve our own character 
or intelligence are actions we have a prima facie duty to perform.”26  And finally, the 
duty of non-maleficence is the duty to avoid actions that could injure others.  This is 
distinct from the duty of beneficence in that it is the active safeguarding against causing 
harm rather than making sure that good things happen to people rather than bad things. 
These seven duties compose Ross’ moral pluralism.  They are what Ross believes 
lie at the bottom of our everyday moral reasoning about situations and actions.  He tells 
us that “the main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not opinions 
which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from the start.”27  These 
duties are then a part of our common-sense morality.  Any other duties we can think of 
will either be found not to be a duty at all or will be a combination of two or more of the 
already established duties.  While Ross believes that any attempt to find more prima facie 
duties will fail, he does not claim that his list is complete or final.  It is possible that we 
do not yet possess the knowledge necessary to see other potential prima facie duties.  All 
that we can do is continue to cultivate our intellect and reevaluate from time to time 
whether we have gained any new knowledge that would lead us to a new prima facie 
                                                
25 Ross 1946 p. 21. 
26 Timmons p. 194. 
27 Ross 1946 p.21f. 
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duty.  In saying this, Ross also leaves open the possibility that there may be a founding 
principle out there that these prima facie duties all rest on.  While he thinks that it is 
impossible for us to ever find it and that it simply does not and can not exist, he does 
acknowledge the fact that someday, once our knowledge has increased, we may find 
something new and need to reevaluate. 
 
Moral Pluralism 
 
 The prima facie duties just outlined are the building blocks of Ross’ moral 
pluralism.  In order for one to decide which course of action should be taken in any given 
situation, the situation is evaluated in light of the prima facie duties.  We make our 
decision on which act to take based on which of the duties is the most pressing in the 
situation.  If only one prima facie duty is relevant to the situation, then the action that 
duty tells you to take is the action you are morally obliged to take.  If no prima facie 
duties are relevant to the situation, then one has no moral obligation and can choose a 
course of action at will because action becomes morally optional.  The last possibility is 
that there is more than one prima facie duty relevant to the situation.  In this case one has 
the more difficult task of figuring out which action is the right action to take. 
 When confronted with a situation where more than one prima facie duty is 
relevant, the agent must figure out which of the prima facie duties is more stringent at 
that particular time.  If the two (or more) are equally stringent, and are not contradictory 
to each other, then the actions are morally optional.  One may choose whichever action 
one desires so long as it does not prevent her from doing another action which is her duty 
to do.  If, as would happen in optimal situations, one of the relevant prima facie duties is 
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obviously more stringent than the other, the agent is morally obligated to do the action 
whose duty is more stringent and morally forbidden from doing the other action.  The 
majority of the time, however, life is not this simple.  When we have to decide which 
course of action to take, it may be incredibly difficult to see which duty is more stringent.  
For example, if I have promised to go to the movies with you and on my way I encounter 
an accident scene, I may be required to break my promise to you and help the accident 
victims if I am and the only person nearby who can help.  But, in an alternate scenario 
where there are already people there to help the accident victims, and any extra help I 
could give would be minimal, I am required to keep my promise to you to go to the 
movies.  Finally, if on my way to meet you, I remember that at the time I had made my 
promise to you I made a similar promise to another friend I become stuck in a moral 
dilemma.  If it is the case that, while both duties are equally stringent, thus making the 
actions appear morally optional (even though at least one must be done), the duties tell 
you to take opposite courses of action.  Ross tells us that in this situation, there is always 
one prima facie duty that is more stringent than the others even if we cannot see it at the 
time.  We need to track down which one that is and then take the course of action it 
prescribes. 
 
What Do We Do When Duties Conflict? 
 
 It is at this point in Ross’ theory that people generally begin to doubt its 
applicability, usefulness, and determinacy.  Most of this doubt stems from two problems.  
The first is that the theory has no way of actually telling us what to do in a situation.  The 
moral agent seems to be left relying on their own sensibilities and has no real direction in 
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their decision making process.  When two duties conflict and tell us to do two 
incompatible actions the agent seems to be left at a standstill.  When we create a moral 
theory, one of the main goals is to have it be determinate.  It needs to tell us what we 
need to do.  In Chapter Three we look at Brad Hooker’s argument from this vein of 
thought. 
 The second general problem is also due to the idea that it is possible for prima 
facie duties to end up in an irresolvable conflict.  When conflicts like this happen the 
moral agent is left to use his own moral judgment to decide on the action he is obliged to 
take.  This is an unattractive idea for many people who believe that if there were a higher 
principle to appeal to these apparently irresolvable conflicts would never occur.  They 
believe that a higher principle is absolutely necessary for a theory if not solely to avoid 
situations such as these.  This would seem to solve our problem immediately, but Ross 
would strongly disagree.  Adding a higher principle would make having the prima facie 
duties null and void.  The theory would become monistic rather than the pluralistic 
system Ross originally intended to set out.  While Ross’ answer to this objection seems 
rather obvious, there are many theorists who have taken this idea as just another reason 
why we need a monistic rather than pluralistic theory.  A monistic theory will be simpler 
and more determinate.  It will make the task of the moral agent easier in creating a higher 
success rate of doing what is morally right.  But Ross replies that “it is more important 
that the theory fit the facts than it be simple.”28  We will see a version of this argument 
against Ross as well in Chapter Two when we look at Hooker’s second argument. 
                                                
28 Ross 1946 p. 19. 
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Rossian Moral Pluralism 
 
 Ross’ version of moral pluralism is founded on the idea that there is a plurality of 
duties in the world due to the plurality of kinds of relationships we have in the world.  A 
moral theory that ignores this fact and attempts to boil down all moral considerations to 
one principle will invariably fail because it is an inaccurate representation of the world 
we live in.  The duties that we do have are prima facie because their stringency can 
change from situation to situation.  It will not always be the case that we should refrain 
from lying.  While we do have a duty of fidelity, if another duty is more stringent in a 
particular situation, then we must follow what that duty tells us to do.  The duties will 
help us to figure out what course of action is morally right, and if we act with the goal in 
mind of following these duties we can be assured that our morally right action is also 
morally good.  Following the prima facie duties in situations will also help us to cultivate 
knowledge (an intrinsic good) and make the task of determining the right course of action 
easier over time.  With this version of Ross’s theory in mind let’s now turn to some 
specific objections to it. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: IS A GROUNDING MORAL PRINCIPLE NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY 
MORAL PLURALISM? 
 
 
Brad Hooker’s Argument 
 
 In his article “Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-consequentialism”, Brad Hooker 
attempts to show that his preferred ethical theory, rule-consequentialism, is “even more 
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attractive than Ross-style Pluralism.”29  In doing this he attempts to show how rule-
consequentialism better fulfills the qualities we require an ethical theory to show.  These 
qualities are; “1) Moral theories must be internally coherent.  2) Moral theories should 
have implications that match the various moral convictions we share and have confidence 
in… 3) Moral theories should specify what (if anything) ties together our various general 
principles and justifies them.  [And] 4) Moral theories should help us deal with moral 
questions about which we are not confident, or do not agree.”30  In light of these qualities 
Hooker believes that Ross-style pluralism, as laid out previously, might be the best moral 
theory available. 
 While Hooker is able to see the potential value in Ross-style pluralism, he also 
feels that pluralism might be lacking in certain areas.  He reminds his reader that “just as 
we must not assume Ross-style pluralism is not the best theory, we must not assume it is 
the best theory [emphasis Hooker’s].”31  We need to ask ourselves what could make a 
theory better than pluralism.  If there is anything, which would make a theory more 
decisive or able to better match our intuitions, then we should most definitely use that 
theory as opposed to pluralism.  If we are able to find “a theory with one first premise 
which justifies all the general duties of Ross-style pluralism, [then] such a theory would 
have everything Ross-style pluralism has plus something extra [emphasis Hooker’s].”32  
It is Hooker’s opinion that rule-consequentialism is able to explain our intuitions just as 
well as Ross-style pluralism but that it has this something extra that will make it a more 
                                                
29 Hooker p. 531. 
30 Hooker p. 531. 
31 Hooker p. 536. 
32 Hooker p. 536. 
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useful and better overall theory.  “A theory which specifies an underlying rationale for 
our various general principles is, other things being at least roughly equal, better than one 
which doesn’t…we would also like (which is not to say we can get) a moral theory that 
ties together and justifies our various moral intuitions.”33 
 Rule-consequentialism, as Hooker advocates, states that “consequences are to be 
used to select rules which then determine the moral permissibility of acts…the most 
plausible version of rule-consequentialism asks which are the possible codes of rules 
whose inculcation in the overwhelming majority of the next generation could reasonably 
be expected to result in as good consequences…as could reasonably be expected to result 
from any other identifiable code.”34  Hooker then goes on to state that rule-
consequentialism does just as good a job as Ross-style pluralism with making sense of 
our various intuitions.  Whether this is truly the case or not will not be debated here.  
Assuming he is correct, Hooker continues saying that while pluralism tells us about our 
intuitions, rule-consequentialism tells us what those intuitions are based on.   
The rule-consequentialist decides which rules to follow based on two 
considerations “expected equality or fairness as well as aggregate well-being,”35 rather 
than the multiplicity of principles Ross describes.  What exactly Hooker means by 
‘expected equality’ and ‘fairness’ is left unexplained but, because of this quality of rule-
consequentialism, some people have argued it is another form of pluralism, just one with 
fewer first-principles.  Hooker clears up this confusion in his argument by expressing the 
                                                
33 Hooker p.536. 
34 Hooker p.537. 
35 Hooker p.539. 
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fact that while there are two things that need to be judged about when figuring out which 
action to take, there is one principle on which decisions are made regarding which rules 
should exist.  This principle is “whether [the rule’s] inculcation could reasonably be 
expected to maximize the good.”36  Ross-style pluralism holds that there is no one 
principle on which we can base decisions about general duties.  It is therefore Hooker’s 
belief that rule-consequentialism is a theory that “seems to have everything Ross-style 
pluralism has – plus something extra, a principle for selecting general duties.  Thus, rule-
consequentialism seems to have more systematic unity than Ross-style pluralism 
[emphasis Hooker’s].”37 
 
David McNaughton’s Response to Hooker 
 
 In his article “An Unconnected Heap of Duties?” David McNaughton attempts to 
give a solution to the types of problems raised by Hooker.  As we will see after 
examining his response, McNaughton fails to fully defend Ross and the idea of a truly 
pluralistic theory.  In response to the criticism of Ross-style pluralism McNaughton 
thinks that “Ross has an entire answer to those who maintain that his theory is 
unsystematic”38 or that it needs a basic principle that unifies all of the other principles it 
has.  He characterizes the objection to pluralism’s many principles as the following:  
“An intuitionist39, such as Ross, merely presents us with a more or less arbitrarily 
selected list of the more common (prima facie) duties and announces them to be 
self-evident.  Since there is no structure to this list, there seems to be no 
explanation of why some items are on the list and not others, and therefore no 
                                                
36 Hooker p.539. 
37 Hooker p.540. 
38 McNaughton 1996 p.434. 
39 All references to ‘intuitionists’ in McNaughton’s article are references to pluralists, more specifically 
Ross-style pluralists (as they were called in Hooker’s article). 
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room for rational debate in the event of disagreement about what should be 
included…Moral theory should facilitate reasoned debate, not forestall it…it is 
doubtful whether intuitionism, unlike utilitarianism, can lay claim to be a moral 
theory at all.”40 
 
McNaughton then goes on to claim that intuitionism attempts to systematize morality just 
as consequentialism does.  There is one main difference in their attempts at 
systematization though.  While consequentialists believe that the principle of beneficence 
is what suffices for a systematization of morality, the intuitionist attempts to “show that 
the plethora of precepts which constitute common-sense morality can be derived from a 
very small number of self-evident basic duties.”41 (Note that although McNaughton says 
a very small number of basic duties, he does not say one single basic moral duty)  While 
some theorists claim that Ross’ list of prima facie duties is merely ‘an unconnected heap’ 
(a random pile of duties that Ross seems to have thrown together for no apparent reason), 
McNaughton disagrees.  The reason why some duties are included in Ross’ list and not 
others is that any other duty besides those given can be employed by simply referring 
back to those duties from which they ultimately came.  The duty to obey the laws of 
one’s country is a prime example of this.  It “arise[s] partly…from the duty of gratitude 
for the benefits one has received from it; partly from the implicit promise to obey…and 
partly (if we are fortunate in our country) from the fact that its laws are potent 
instruments for the general good.”42  Because of this, McNaughton thinks that the 
objection that there is no way to determine which sorts of principles should and should 
                                                
40 McNaughton 1996 p.434. 
41 McNaughton 1996 p.435. 
42 Ross 1946 p.27-28. 
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not be on ‘the list’ is unfounded.  As we just briefly saw, there are guidelines to Ross’ list 
of prima facie duties.  The list is not nearly as arbitrary as one would think at the outset. 
 The second half of McNaughton’s response to the problem of the unconnected 
heap  directly tackles the question Hooker raised in his article, that “while Ross’ list is by 
no means an arbitrary heap, the basic duties are still unconnected, and that this is a 
weakness in his theory.”43  There is a plethora of reasons why someone might claim this 
against pluralism.  They might think that a simpler theory is more pregnant and practical 
for everyday usage but McNaughton reminds us of Ross’ general idea when constructing 
his theory in The Right and the Good.  Ross told us in the midst of sketching this 
somewhat confusing ethical theory that not only does a theory need explanatory power 
but also that “it is more important that the theory fit the facts than it be simple.”44 
 McNaughton next mentions the objection that “a theory which admits the 
existence of distinct and irreducible moral principles gains in systemic unity if those 
principles are generated by some unitary justificatory procedure, as is the case with 
Kantianism, or with rule-consequentialism.”45  His response to this potential problem is 
that while other theories have a test that determines principles independently of one 
another, Ross also has a test to determine the principles.  Kantianism’s test to determine 
what principles we should use is the Categorical Imperative while rule-
consequentialism’s test is what could be expected to produce good consequences when 
adopted by the next generation.  Ross’ test though determines the prima facie duties as 
                                                
43 McNaughton 1996 p.440. 
44 Ross 1946 p.19. 
45 McNaughton 1996 p.441. 
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they relate to each other.  He looks at whether any potentially new prima facie duties can 
be found in some combination of the others already established or if they are actually 
some more fundamental prima facie duty than those already established.  This is the 
entirety of McNaughton’s response to the type of objection to Ross-style pluralism as we 
saw put forward by Hooker.  The general idea of the response is that moral pluralism’s 
prima facie duties are selected because they are not derivative from each other and are the 
most fundamental principles one can get from our intuitions.  The idea that there is 
nothing tying them together does not fit the theory because their relationship to each 
other as the most basic duties we have based on the relationships we are in is what makes 
the duties a whole and what does the connecting.  They rely on each other and that they 
come from our relationships for their justification. 
 
The Failure of McNaughton’s Solution 
 
 In an attempt to defend moral pluralism against opponents who believe that the 
principles (prima facie duties) it holds are unconnected and just a random group, 
McNaughton attempts to show how the duties that Ross has established are wholly 
distinct from one another in that they cannot be derived from each other.  As we know 
from Ross’ initial lay out of his theory, he automatically uses this response in order to try 
and stop this type of specific objection before it ever leaves the ground.  As was seen in 
the example Ross gives regarding why we should follow the laws of our own country, 
any duties we may think should be included in Ross’ list are covered by the duties 
already present.  It is in this way that we only end up with the most basic of the duties we 
need and have the definitive list Ross created.  Of all of the prima facie duties listed by 
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Ross, none can be derived from the others or an amalgamation of more than one of them.  
McNaughton brings this idea out at the start of his attempt at refuting Hooker’s objection. 
 The next step that McNaughton takes in defending Ross is to say that while 
Hooker believes some principle is necessary to ground and justify the prima facie duties 
Ross has created, a principle is not necessary.  While I agree with McNaughton’s general 
idea that a principle is not necessary, I do not agree with his reasons for saying so.  As we 
will see in the next section, there is a way of grounding and justifying the moral 
principles we have without appealing to some principle.  McNaughton’s specific response 
as to why we do not have to appeal to any sort of principle in order to justify or ground 
the moral principles we adopt is that the relationship between the principles we have 
adopted is enough justification to fully ground the principles.  The relationship between 
the individual prima facie duties, what connects them together, is that they all come from 
our relationships with others.  This idea implies that he believes there is some sort of 
specific relationship between the seven prima facie duties but he later states that a 
specific relationship exists between only three of Ross’ basic seven prima facie duties.  
“At least some of and perhaps all of our duties, both basic and derivative, do have 
something in common: they rest on relationships between persons, each different 
relationship generating a specific duty…Of the seven basic duties which Ross has on his 
original list, three – fidelity, gratitude, and reparation – seem to fit this description 
neatly.”46  Unless a relationship exists definitively between each of the prima facie duties, 
                                                
46 McNaughton 1996 p.441. 
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McNaughton cannot rely on this idea of their relationships to ground and justify the 
duties in question.   
In addition to this initial problem with McNaughton’s defense there is also 
something else that seems strange.  McNaughton seems to go through some pains to 
effectively make the statement that each of the prima facie duties is included on Ross’ list 
of duties because they are distinct from one another and cannot be reduced into each 
other or into another more fundamental principle but above we saw him say that “at least 
some and perhaps all of our duties…rest on relationships between persons.”47  If this 
statement is true, and McNaughton solves the initial problem we have just raised by 
telling us that each of the prima facie duties does have that concrete relationship with the 
others, the quality of having something to do with the relationships between persons, then 
it seems we have not only found something to ground all of the prima facie duties on, but 
also something more fundamental than them.  Ross’ theory could potentially be grounded 
on a moral principle that tells us to perform those actions that will honor our 
relationships.  There is one main problem with McNaughton’s solution.  The idea behind 
moral pluralism is that there is no one moral principle on which the seven prima facie 
duties can rest.  To connect each of the duties in this way is doing something that Ross 
would not have agreed with.  It would change the prima facie duties into merely 
secondary considerations behind the more important absolute duty to honor our 
relationships when in fact we need the prima facie duties as they are.  An absolute duty to 
honor our relationships would strip us of our ability to put them aside when necessary.  
                                                
47 McNaughton 1996 p.441. 
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While Ross does tell us that “each of these relations[hips] is the foundation of a 
prima facie duty”48 he does not mean this to be taken any further than just a way to 
decipher which duties our common-sense morality generally imposes on us.  Each of the 
prima facie duties comes from a common attribute found in our relationships with people.  
The fact that they are all slightly connected in their having been found while examining 
our relationships is something that is trivially true and is in no way meant to be a 
justificatory procedure.  To answer why it is that these prima facie duties need to be 
adhered to when it happens they become our specific duty we need something more than 
how we were able to discover what they are.  If we relied solely on McNaughton’s 
reasons for justifying the prima facie duties then it is probably the case that we would 
have adopted other prima facie duties out of our relationships solely because they will 
better preserve and honor our relationships.  It is not far fetched, especially in today’s 
world, to imagine a prima facie duty prohibiting arguing or free speech altogether, all for 
the sake of our relationships.  There has to be some other way we can attempt to bind 
together and justify our moral principles.  As we will see in the next section, Berys Gaut 
is someone who has been able to formulate just how it is that we are able to justify Ross’ 
prima facie duties. 
 
Berys Gaut’s Response to Hooker 
 
 In his article “Rag-bags, Disputes and Moral Pluralism”, Berys Gaut makes a 
direct attempt, unlike McNaughton, to dispel the objections raised by Hooker.  As a 
preliminary to examining how Hooker is mistaken in his objections Gaut first lays out 
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how Hooker’s assumption that rule-consequentialism can reflect our intuitions just as 
well as Ross-style pluralism is unfounded and not necessarily true.  Hooker’s rule-
consequentialism is only able to reflect our intuitions in a way similar to moral pluralism 
because it also provides a plurality of principles for us to use in a decision making 
process.  Instead of the pluralist being required to show how it is not just another version 
of rule-consequentialism, Gaut believes that Hooker must provide reasons why rule-
consequentialism is not just another form of moral pluralism.  This defense Hooker needs 
occurs when he adopts the agent-neutral principle that rules should only be adopted 
which could be expected to produce the greatest number of good if adopted by 
generations to follow.  The fact that this principle is agent-neutral is what “gives his 
theory its consequentialism tenor.”49  His adoption of this agent-neutral principle allows 
rule-consequentialism to represent some of our intuitions from our common sense 
morality, but it is not able to represent all of them. 
 In order to represent our intuitions as well as moral pluralism does, rule-
consequentialism has to also cover agent-relative conceptions of moral commitment from 
this agent-neutral perspective.  Gaut supplies the example of “the rule that each person 
has special duties of care towards her own children.”50  While Hooker can say that there 
is a general rule “that each person has some minimal duties of care to everyone,”51 he 
must be able to justify that we have some duty to our own children from this agent-
neutral perspective.  “To do so [he] will have to appeal to empirical psychological facts, 
                                                
49 Gaut 1999 p.39. 
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such as that children will likely be better looked after by their own parents than by 
others.”52  According to Gaut, a justification such as this does not completely cover the 
force behind why it is that I have this special duty to my children.  Our common-sense 
morality tells us that there is something special about the relationship between me and my 
children, besides the fact that I may be able to better care for them than someone else, 
that imparts on me the duty to care for them.  Just like the rest of Ross’ pluralism, the 
benefit that can be gained from taking a specific action is not what is important.  What is 
important is the specific, agent-relative, parent-child relationship that exists.  There is no 
way for any agent-neutral conception of why parents should care for their own children to 
cover this area of the relationship.  The agent-neutral idea that children are likely to be 
better cared for by their own parents ignores why it actually is the case that children are 
better off with their parents.  There is something special about the parent-child 
relationship that makes this so and only an agent-relative theory can fully cover this.  
Hooker’s rule-consequentialism is unable to fully capture this special relationship that we 
seem to find in our common-sense morality so, according to Gaut it cannot be as good as 
moral pluralism in matching our intuitions. 
In attempting to refute Hooker’s objection that rule-consequentialism is better 
than Ross-style pluralism (hereafter referred to as simply moral pluralism) Gaut reminds 
us that what we consider our common sense morality is essentially pluralistic because we 
appeal to many principles when generally deciding what to do, and, “given the credence 
our pre-reflective beliefs possess, we would need to be given good reasons for supposing 
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that this pluralism is mere appearance, hiding a deeper, single moral principle.”53  
“Having something extra is not always welcome.”54  While Hooker claims that we need 
to have something extra around to unify the moral principles we have, Gaut captures the 
spirit of moral pluralism and states that this is exactly what is up for debate between the 
pluralist and the monist.  “If the extra offered is a single moral principle which unifies all 
other moral principles, then it is a moot point for the consequentialist to claim this as an 
advantage of his theory, since it is precisely the existence of such a principle that is in 
dispute between him and the pluralist.”55  While we would all probably agree that it 
would be good to have something available to bind and justify our moral principles, Gaut 
goes on to argue that there is no reason to assume, as Hooker and his rule-
consequentialists do, that it has to be a moral principle doing the binding and justifying.  
“The issue is about what is to do this tying together and justifying – whether it is to be 
done by a moral principle, or by some general rational justification procedure for the 
principles that the pluralist advances [emphasis Gaut’s].”56 
The answer to Gaut’s questions is clearly that the pluralist would agree that there 
is a rational justification procedure that binds and justifies the moral principles together.  
There is no first principle from which they all have developed but a procedure on which 
they can be grounded.  The procedure the pluralist uses is reflective equilibrium. 
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“She takes these moral intuitions and principles we pre-reflectively endorse (i.e. 
common sense morality) and attempts to render them consistent with each other; 
she corrects for distortions in our moral reasoning that can be traced to unfair 
deliberative conditions…The reflective equilibrium to which she appeals is not 
just narrow (adjusting moral principles to moral intuitions), but is wide, appealing 
to non-evaluative facts…and to evaluations that encompass more than merely 
moral matters, such as those evaluations displayed in many of our personal 
relationships…The pluralist’s account of why we possess just these moral 
principles, then, rests on the initial credence of our pre-reflectively endorsed 
intuitions and principles, and their increased credence when they are subjected to 
a greater degree of reflective improvement drawing on a wide variety of 
resources, both evaluative and non-evaluative.”57   
 
With this procedure in place there is no need for the pluralist to have a first principle on 
which to ground their other moral principles.  The procedure of reflective equilibrium is 
more than enough to justify how all of the principles come together and why we have the 
principles we have and no others.  It is not just a random group of principles thrown 
together, but a meticulously formed list that is constantly being evaluated in order to 
assure its adherence to our intuitions and the facts that we know about the world.  “It is 
difficult to see what additional argument there could be for the claim that justification by 
a single moral principle is also required”58 because the reasons Hooker gives for the 
necessity of a moral principle are fulfilled by the use of the reflective equilibrium 
process. 
 It is possible, as Gaut points out, that opponents of pluralism will insist that it is 
possible, when the pluralist attempts to expand on her account of moral commitments that 
the appeal of a single moral principle will once again come into play.  One such example 
of what the pluralist may be tempted to say, according to opponents, will be that “the best 
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account of why we have the moral system we do will ground the moral rules on the good 
consequences of observing them.  The challenge to the pluralist is then to show that this 
reduction to a single moral principle will not take place.”59  To show this Gaut mentions 
how the specific relationships we are in with people give us certain moral commitments.  
In regard to someone we love, there are many ways in which we feel we have obligations 
toward them that, if we were to neglect, would result in the disintegration of the 
relationship.  “Such special obligations must be acknowledged if love is to possess its 
recognizable and characteristic shape.”60  In this example Gaut feels he is able to “derive 
moral commitments from a broader evaluative stance, a stance that is partially 
constitutive of valuable social relationships.”61  These agent-relative duties that derive 
from the relationships we are in are necessary in order for us to continue having these 
relationships.   
We, as communal beings, are also able to associate ourselves with others and put 
ourselves in their position.  “By imaginatively detaching myself from my own 
perspective and that of my community, I can recognize that the activities and feelings of 
outsiders may be as intrinsically valuable as my own.  Hence by deploying my 
imaginative capacities, I can recognize the existence of the agent-neutral value of certain 
states of affairs.”62  The fact that we are able to derive both agent-neutral and agent-
relative values, using our common sense capacities, tells us that “we cannot without 
grievous loss either to our relationships or to our cognitive capacities give either side 
                                                
59 Gaut 1999 p.42. 
60 Gaut 1999 p.42. 
61 Gaut 1999 p.42. 
62 Gaut 1999 p.43. 
 34 
up.”63  Both are necessary in order to do sufficient justice to our intuitions.  It is 
impossible to reduce one to the other because the agent-relative values come solely from 
our relationships which “we value independently from an agent-neutrally impartial 
view,”64 regardless of their influence on the general good.  There is therefore no way to 
tie all the moral commitments we have together based on one single aspect the way in 
which rule-consequentialism does without leaving behind or neglecting some crucial 
aspect of our commitments and values.  The question of whether the pluralist can explain 
why we have our moral commitments without resorting to any sort of consequentialist 
answer is therefore put to bed.  Pluralists have a way of binding and justifying their 
principles that does not rely on one ultimate moral principle, and they can explain why 
we have commitments without everything boiling down to some version of 
consequentialism at the end of the day. 
 
The Success of Reflective Equilibrium  
 
 The response given by Berys Gaut to Hooker’s objection that moral pluralism 
needs some sort of justifying and grounding first moral principle for it to be as good a 
theory as rule-consequentialism is something that Ross would have completely agreed 
with.  In his exposition of the idea of reflective equilibrium, he lays out exactly what 
Ross seems to be trying to say.  Reflective equilibrium is explained by John Rawls to be 
the process of “going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual 
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to 
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principle…eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles that match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”65  In describing how it is that we can ever know 
the moral principles we hold when they are not evident from the beginning of our lives, 
Gaut tells us that “they come to be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do…by 
experience…we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfillment of 
a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another promise, 
and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we apprehend 
prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment of promise” (Ross 1946).   
This process, as outlined by Rawls and Gaut, of learning and adjusting what our 
moral principles are and constantly looking at them through the lens of whether they 
conflict with known empirical fact or what our intuitions seem to tell us is one that Ross 
uses many times throughout The Right and the Good.  We see it first when he looks at the 
difference between morally right and morally good and then again when he tries to lay 
out which types of things can be considered intrinsic goods.  There is no reason to reject 
the idea that Ross used this process to discover his prima facie duties.  He uses a process 
of reflection to look at the relationships we have with other people and then reflective 
equilibrium to see which of the duties we have because of these relationships are the most 
fundamental.  According to Ross, people “stand to me in the relation of promisee to 
promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, 
of fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the like; and each of these relations is 
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the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according to 
the circumstances of the case.”66  We have these moral principles/prima facie duties 
because of the relationships that we are in but they are discovered, guided, bound, and 
justified based on a process of reflective equilibrium in line with what Gaut has laid out.  
Ross would agree with Rawls’ statement that “justification rests upon the entire 
conception and how it fits in with and organizes our considered judgments in reflective 
equilibrium…justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together into one coherent view.”67 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CAN MORAL PLURALISM SOLVE MORAL DILEMMAS? 
 
 
Hooker’s Second Argument 
 
A second fact Hooker thinks we should keep in mind regarding the benefit of 
having a first principle in our moral theory is how useful it can really be.  “Finding out 
that some more basic principle underwrites our various shared and confident general 
moral principles would presumably be not only satisfying intellectually but also 
important practically [emphasis Hooker’s].”68  According to Hooker, there are some 
moral dilemmas and “unsettled moral questions”69 that pluralism just can not solve 
without the aid of a higher moral principle.  Discovering this principle is necessary in 
order to have a fully determinate moral theory that can help us escape moral dilemmas.  
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“A moral theory that did not help with unsettled moral questions would let us down.  
Other things being equal, a theory that helps more is better.”70 
 If, as Hooker claims, rule-consequentialism is a better and more determinate 
theory than Ross-style pluralism, then rule-consequentialism should be able to help us 
resolve disputes much better than the alternative could.  According to Hooker, Ross-style 
pluralism has two attributes that allow it to respond to moral disputes.  The first is that 
moral pluralism “can call for improvements in the light of improved empirical 
information.”71  When information is found that shows that either our general principles 
or specific judgments are off or mistaken, Ross-style pluralism allows for the adjusting of 
them to reflect our newly gathered information.  The second is that “we can also criticize 
our moral practices on the basis of any of our general principles.”72  What this means is 
that if some moral practice seems to be the norm but was instated as the norm during a 
time where conditions were not fair, we have every reason to reevaluate the situation in 
fair conditions and declare the moral practice to be followed or abandoned. 
 Rule-consequentialism, according to Hooker, can and does do a better job at 
resolving disputes than Ross-style pluralism does.  Because of its greater determinacy, it 
has many more qualities that allow it to resolve disputes than pluralism’s lonely two 
attributes.  Moral pluralism’s indeterminacy is personified by its inability to resolve 
disputes.  The example Hooker uses to elucidate Ross-style pluralism’s difficulty with 
adjudicating disputes and criticizing moral principles is the principle of chastity.  The 
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principle of chastity is the historically basic principle that prohibits “sex outside 
marriage.”73  This principle is no longer the staple in society that it once was and has 
been heavily disputed as to whether it should still be accepted as a reason for refraining 
from certain behaviors.  According to Hooker, the only way for a pluralist to enter this 
dispute and potentially challenge the principle of chastity, as he supposes any moral 
theory would want to, is to either say that it has a potential conflict with the duty of 
beneficence or that it is ungrounded. 
The moral pluralist will want to challenge this principle because the list of prima-
facie duties is supposed to be fairly complete according to Ross and accepting the 
principle of chastity would create a need to add a new prima facie duty, a duty which is 
fairly controversial, to Ross’ list.  To say that it has a potential conflict with the duty of 
beneficence is not a way of dismissing the principle of chastity in Hooker’s view because 
it is possible for any principle to conflict with the duty of beneficence because of the 
nature of the principle of beneficence.74  There is always a chance that what a principle 
requires us to do will not result in as much good as an alternative principle.  The duties 
and principles already established by Ross all have this characteristic of potentially 
conflicting with the duty of beneficence so if the principle of chastity is to be dismissed, 
it must be for something other than this potential conflict.  Also, saying that the principle 
of chastity is ungrounded does not work for the pluralist in Hooker’s view.  “Ross-style 
pluralism proclaims that all the other basic general principles it affirms likewise have no 
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deeper grounding [emphasis Hooker’s]”75 so the principle of chastity, if it were to be 
accepted, would be no different from the principles pluralism already accepts.  It is in its 
inability to give any sort of argument unseating the principle that moral pluralism shows 
its indeterminacy.  Rule-consequentialism, on the other hand, can attack chastity by 
showing how chastity is not the best way to maximize happiness in the world.  Hooker’s 
theory has some other principle to attack the principle of chastity with that does not 
damage his theory when used.  How well it can do this and whether Hooker is correct in 
assuming this will not be discussed here.  Assuming that it is true that rule-
consequentialism is ‘better’ than Ross-style pluralism in this way, our task later will be to 
show that Ross’ theory is just as good, if not better, at entering into the debate about 
alternative moral principles. 
 Another area where Ross-style pluralism is lacking, according to Hooker, is in 
tackling not just disputes about moral principles but also disputes about moral issues.  
Hooker takes up the problem of euthanasia in order to draw out where pluralism is 
lacking in solving moral problems.  Hooker says, “By “euthanasia”, I mean killing or 
letting die for the good of the patient.  Of course there are questions about who (if 
anyone) is to carry out the euthanasia and about what safeguards need to be in place.  But 
will Ross-style pluralism get as far as these questions, or will it rule out euthanasia from 
the start [emphasis Hooker’s]?”76  The reason why Hooker asks this question is because 
there is more than one way to interpret Ross’ prima facie duty of non-maleficence.  It has 
to be taken at the very least as the duty to prevent physical injury.  According to Hooker, 
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this seems to leave open the problems of indirect harm, mental injury, and other non-
physical injuries that are able to be inflicted on a person.  When a situation occurs where 
one would be inflicting physical harm on someone in order to relieve another more severe 
type of harm, for instance killing them in a pain free manner in order to relieve them of 
the pain they will have to endure while they die from a vicious incurable disease, Hooker 
wonders how the pluralist will go about making a decision to kill them or not.   
He hypothesizes that the Ross-style pluralist’s response will be to say that this is a 
situation where our solution requires that the duty of non-maleficence “should be 
modified so as to produce more overall good.  However, if Ross-style pluralists appeal to 
this thought, they seem to have fallen back on rule-consequentialist thinking [emphasis 
Hooker’s].”77  It is because of this that Hooker thinks any real attempt for the pluralist to 
resolve moral dilemmas will ultimately fall back on rule-consequentialist thinking, 
making rule-consequentialism a superior theory to Ross-style pluralism.  The detail of 
Ross’ theory that comes into question here is not just whether it is possible for duties to 
conflict or not but also whether it is possible for there to be a ranking of the duties.  If 
there were a viable ranking, then it seems that one could just appeal to the higher ranking 
principle to solve a moral dilemma.  If this course of action is taken, though, Ross’ 
pluralism seems to turn into a monistic theory appealing to the highest principle.  It is 
also, as Hooker points out, in grave danger of simply appealing to the prima facie duty of 
beneficence and falling back on rule-consequentialism to resolve its disputes. 
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McNaughton’s Response to the Moral Dilemma Problem 
 
 In an attempt to respond to the criticisms raised against pluralism’s ability to 
solve moral problems or disputes (as we just saw exemplified by Hooker), McNaughton 
lays out how the prima facie duties relate to each other within deliberation.  
Unfortunately for McNaughton this response does not do much to quell the questions 
Hooker has raised about Ross-style pluralism.  Before he goes into detail, McNaughton 
gives us a brief synopsis of what many believe Ross’ general position is.  He states that 
“Ross is standardly interpreted as claiming that a conflict between duties in a particular 
case can only be resolved by determining what weight those duties carry in that case; 
nothing in general can be said about the relative weight of different kinds of duties…This 
interpretation runs counter to the text.”78  This leads McNaughton to tell us what the 
correct interpretation of Ross theory regarding conflict of duties would be. 
 In The Right and the Good, according to McNaughton, Ross is attempting to find 
some sort of middle ground between “the complete generalism of absolutism (or indeed 
of a lexical ordering of duties) which gives no consideration to the circumstances of the 
particular case, and a doctrine of prima facie duties which makes the outcome of any 
conflict depend solely upon the wholly individual circumstances of the particular case 
[emphasis McNaughton’s].”79  This would allow for Ross to have a general ranking of 
the duties, a way they tend to stack up, and say that some seem to be intrinsically 
weightier than others.  The first duty McNaughton mentions as special and distinct from 
the others in some way is the duty of non-maleficence.  Ross lays out that the duty of 
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non-maleficence is “both distinct from and more binding than the duty of beneficence,”80 
as was previously mentioned. 
McNaughton then goes on to claim that this idea of non-maleficence being more 
binding than beneficence is unnecessary.  All that we need in order to make decisions 
regarding actions, according to McNaughton, is to claim that each of the duties Ross lays 
out are distinct from one another.  This, he thinks, will clear up any problems we may 
encounter in the decision making process.  For example, the duties of fidelity and non-
maleficence are distinct and separate duties from the duty of beneficence.  According to 
McNaughton, it is from this that we are able to infer that “first, where the balance of good 
between the two courses of action is (roughly) equal, the other duty will be decisive, 
because beneficence will not favor one course over the other.”81  An example of this 
would be if we had to choose who to save when two people are drowning.  We can 
generally cause the same amount of good to come about by saving either of them but if 
another prima facie duty is relevant to the situation then that duty will be the decisive 
factor in telling us who we should save. 
McNaughton tells us that we are also able to infer that “where the balance of 
good, and therefore beneficence, counts morally in favor of one course of action, but 
some other duty…counts against doing it, then beneficence will only win if it has 
sufficient weight to outweigh the other duty.”82  This can be seen in the question of 
whether or not to incarcerate a criminal.  Putting the person in prison will create a good 
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for society but it will also strip that person of their freedom and potentially do irreparable 
harm to them.  The only way the pluralist can be justified in putting the person in prison 
is if the good created by their removal from society will outweigh the harm caused to 
them.  The duty that will create some good will have to create an enormous surplus of 
good so that the breach of duties can be justified.  Unless that burden is satisfied the other 
duties must be respected and upheld. 
McNaughton does mention a problem with this idea that only a sufficient amount 
of good can cause us to breach one of our other duties in a situation.  When looking at the 
ranges of possibilities of the importance or stringency of the duties, we find that “there 
seems to be no limit to the amount of benefit that might flow from a single action, there is 
no top to the scale of beneficence.”83  This means that it will be incredibly difficult to 
know when another duty could possibly outweigh the duty of beneficence.  The only 
possible way out of this would be if, when we spoke of, say, the duty of fidelity we 
looked not at whether our promise was more stringent than the good we could produce by 
breaking it, but at whether the promise, in the grand scheme of promises, was trivial or 
particularly stringent and binding.  If it is particularly binding then no amount of good we 
could produce could free us of that promise.  “The weight to be accorded to a duty is not 
just a function of the good produced, there does not seem to be anything in his system 
which prevents his claiming that serious cases of promise-breaking could have a moral 
weight which could not be outweighed by any amount of good to be achieved on the 
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other side.”84  McNaughton then goes on to say that while this is the case, there is no 
textual evidence Ross ever held this view and continues by claiming that “most of us feel 
that there are situations in which it would be right to break a promise, however 
solemn.”85 
McNaughton then continues by saying that something like this idea about solemn 
promises can be used in regard to the prima facie duty of non-maleficence.  “While it can 
be right to inflict some comparatively slight harm in order to secure a great good or avert 
a disaster, it may be that it can never be right to inflict a very serious harm, such as 
killing an innocent child, to achieve a good end.”86  According to McNaughton, Ross 
cannot hold the idea that it is never right to inflict serious harm though because the same 
problems we saw with the idea of never breaking a solemn promise come up.  If he did 
accept it, it could make room within Ross’ prima facie duties for “an absolute constraint 
against killing the innocent”87 just as we had with fidelity and a potential absolute 
constraint against breaking solemn promises.  This is, McNaughton acknowledges, what 
Ross wanted to avoid at all costs so it must not be what Ross meant when he claimed that 
some duties are generally always more stringent than others. 
With all of this in mind McNaughton is left to claim that “Ross was just confused 
when he thought that he needed, in order to explain our moral judgments, to claim not 
only that there were duties distinct from beneficence, but also that the former were more 
stringent than the latter.  We are left, then, with the claim that all we can do, when faced 
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with a moral conflict, is to look carefully at the particular case in all its complexity and 
form a reasonable judgment as to which duty (or duties) carry the most weight.”88  The 
fact that pluralism, according to his exposition, does not provide a way to solve moral 
disputes is not a problem with Ross’ theory in his eyes.  According to McNaughton, it is 
a failure of intuitionism in general that it doesn’t give guidance regarding resolution of 
moral conflicts but it is not a failure of pluralism.  This is because giving guidance about 
moral conflicts was not a part of Ross’ aim.  Critics of pluralism’s lack of problem 
solving are expecting too much from Ross’ theory.  They expect a moral theory to offer 
general guidance about how to solve a moral conflict.  “Ross has a much less ambitious 
picture of the role of moral theory than that.  The job of moral theory is simply to see 
which general account of the nature of our duties (and of goodness) give the best overall 
picture of our moral thinking.  There is no question of theory revealing answers to moral 
questions that cannot otherwise be answered, or justifying what would not otherwise be 
justified.”89  Trying to find the answers to moral questions within an abstract theory is to 
look in the wrong place.  Ross’ theory was never meant to solve these kinds of questions 
because no theory can ever really solve these types of questions and still be true to our 
intuition that there is some sort of conflict there.  Thus, McNaughton gives a defense of 
Ross-style pluralism against the attacks it receives because of its apparent inability to 
solve moral disputes and dilemmas. 
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How McNaughton’s Solution Fails to Solve Moral Dilemmas 
 
 When McNaughton attempts to rescue pluralism from problems similar to those 
Hooker raised regarding its seeming inability to resolve moral dilemmas or evaluate 
moral principles, he began by looking at what he thinks Ross was trying to do when he 
drew out the relationships the prima facie duties have with one another in practice.  
According to McNaughton, Ross tells us that the duty of non-maleficence is not only 
distinct from the duty of beneficence but also more binding than it.  This distinction is 
something that McNaughton feels is unnecessary and that Ross was confused in making.  
It seems that he thinks Ross just decided that the theory would be better if non-
maleficence was more stringent than beneficence so he declared it to be so.  This is not 
the case.  In every decision and move Ross made throughout The Right and the Good, he 
followed our common sense morality and attempted to give a thorough explanation of 
why it is we tend to have the duties and take the actions that we do.  It would make no 
sense if Ross decided to conveniently forget one large part of our common sense 
morality.  That the prima facie duties do in fact seem to stack up in specific ways in 
specific situations is evident from looking at the relationships we have.  The fact that the 
prima facie duty of non-maleficence tends to be more stringent than the duty of 
beneficence is something that cannot be ignored.   
In most everyday personal interactions with others we find when made to choose 
whether to produce or prevent comparable amounts of benefit for them or harm to them, 
we will generally choose to prevent the harm.  Granted there are many situations where 
we could imagine choosing to produce the benefit rather than prevent the harm, but 
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regardless of what we chose to do, another of Ross’ prima facie duties comes into play, 
the duty of reparation.  If we prevent someone from receiving some benefit or cause 
someone to endure some harm, we tend to feel a duty to make it up to that person.  This 
impetus to make up for wrongs people endure that we could have prevented seems to be 
much stronger when we have caused them to endure some kind of pain or harm than if 
they were kept from receiving some benefit.  Knowing this tells us that our common 
sense morality tends to make us feel worse about what we have done if we have given 
someone pleasure at the sake of someone else being left to endure some sort of pain.  
Therefore it seems that the prima facie duty of non-maleficence tends to take precedent 
over the prima facie duty of beneficence.  This might not always be the case, but it is the 
way the situation tends to work out.  Ross was not confused in stating that some of the 
prima facie duties are generally more stringent than others; he was simply revealing what 
was already existent in our intuitions and common sense morality.  Later in this chapter 
we will look more at what these tendencies mean for the possibility of solving moral 
dilemmas. 
 A second problem that McNaughton raises with the idea that some prima facie 
duties can be more stringent than the duty of beneficence is the idea that there is no limit 
to the amount of benefit someone can receive from an action.  With any event, there is an 
amount of benefit someone can receive from it immediately, but there is also an amount 
of benefit that may come over time from that action.  It is even possible that the person 
receives no benefit at the time the act occurs and only receives benefit from it later on.  
What McNaughton is trying to say here is that you can never know how much benefit 
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someone will ever really receive from an action.  Without knowing this, you cannot say 
that an act does not produce enough of a surplus of good to override another duty.  While 
McNaughton is correct in saying that the benefit we can receive from a situation does not 
all occur instantaneously, with the majority of actions, it tends to be the case that the 
benefit one would receive from an action can be substantially determined at the time the 
action takes place.  In most cases, the benefit that does not occur initially is miniscule in 
comparison to what was initially created so anything occurring after the fact is not 
incredibly influential.  In other cases, such as education, we can easily foresee the benefit 
one will receive from it in the long run.  Any minute benefits the action causes later on do 
not generally change our opinion as to whether or not the action should be pursued.  They 
add very little to the initial value of the action.  If we are in a situation where the main 
benefit of the action only occurs later on, this is something that is taken into account 
when deciding whether or not to take up the action.  The fact that the initial benefit of the 
action is zero is not what we would be concerned with in the situation.  While 
McNaughton is correct in saying that the possible benefit we can get from an action has 
no pre-set limit, this does not prevent us from looking at the duty of beneficence in 
relation to the other duties and deciding whether or not some of them tend to be more 
stringent than it and should be followed rather than following the duty of beneficence. 
 The main problem with McNaughton’s solution to the problem of moral 
dilemmas is that he declares that Ross never says, or would want to say, that “serious 
cases of promise-breaking could have a moral weight which could not be outweighed by 
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any amount of good to be achieved on the other side.”90  This would leave room for 
absolute prohibitions on killing an innocent person in McNaughton’s eyes.  He is 
absolutely correct in saying that Ross would never say or want to say something like that.  
Unfortunately for him, he is correct but for the wrong reasons.  Ross would never say that 
there are certain promises which can never be overridden because he is not an absolutist.  
His entire theory is about the tendencies we have to behave in certain ways and never 
once declares that we always take up a certain action in a certain situation.  What Ross 
would agree to, along these same lines, is that there are serious cases of promise-breaking 
that could have a moral weight which tends to not be outweighed by any amount of good 
to be achieved on the other side.  We already know, through common-sense morality that 
we should generally not break solemn promises or kill the innocent but we also know that 
there may tend to be times where according to the prima facie duties we are required to 
break a promise that may be considered solemn or to kill someone who is innocent.  In a 
situation where we must either keep our solemn promise to a person or save their life or, 
alternatively, if we must either kill one innocent person or let one-hundred other people 
die, we must do the action we would normally prohibit or be guilty of neglecting our 
moral obligations. 
Certain moral dilemmas, like Hooker’s example of euthanasia, cannot be solved 
in McNaughton’s eyes.  Any attempts saying we must never undertake acts like 
euthanasia or breaking solemn promises will end up creating an absolutist principle.  
There is no evidence in Ross’ work that he would accept such a principle nor should it be 
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accepted based on the content of his theory.  This leaves McNaughton to mistakenly 
claim that Ross thinks “there is no question of revealing answers to moral questions that 
cannot otherwise be answered or justifying what would not otherwise be justified…where 
there are puzzling moral conflicts, moral theory will not help to resolve them.”91  On the 
contrary Ross believes that there is a way to escape moral conflicts such as these.  A 
specific explanation of the way Ross prescribes we resolve moral conflicts will be 
explained in the last section of this chapter.  For now it will suffice to say that Ross 
believes that a moral theory’s role is not just to give a “general account of the nature of 
our duties”92 but that it should “fit the facts.”93  There is no evidence in The Right and the 
Good that Ross would agree with McNaughton in saying that moral theory is not meant 
to solve moral dilemmas.  The task of proving that Ross’ moral pluralism can solve moral 
dilemmas and can therefore compete with theories such as Hooker’s rule-
consequentialism has not been accomplished by McNaughton. 
 
Gaut’s Response to the Moral Dilemma Problem 
 
 Hooker’s second argument that moral pluralism is not able to solve moral 
problems is also tackled by Gaut.  After having laid out that there is no need to have an 
underlying principle and showing that pluralism does not just fall back into rule-
consequentialism when explaining why we have moral commitments, Gaut attempts to 
show how pluralism can respond to the accusation that it is unable to solve moral 
dilemmas. 
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 The rational justification procedure that Gaut lays out for how we can bind and 
justify our moral principles is the same way in which we can change and “overturn many 
of our cherished moral intuitions, since they may be shown to be subtly inconsistent with 
our principles, to rest on false empirical beliefs, or to be such as to be agreed to only 
under unfair deliberative conditions.”94  Hooker acknowledges that moral pluralism can 
do this, but he still thinks that his rule-consequentialism can do a better job solving 
disputes.  Gaut thinks that he has found the same problem with Hooker’s second problem 
as he did with Hooker’s first.  While Hooker is looking for moral pluralism to do 
something specific, he might not be looking in the right place.  Gaut posits the idea that 
“the inability to resolve a dispute may not stem from a failure in a moral theory, but it 
may be the result of a genuine indeterminacy about what morally ought to be done in the 
case of certain moral problems…and also in respect of certain moral dilemmas.”95  It is 
wholly possible that some situations do not have the simple solution that Hooker is 
looking for.  It is also possible that some situations truly are moral dilemmas and just do 
not have one specific solution that absolutely must be the case. 
 The next aspect that Gaut looks at in trying to eliminate Hooker’s problem is the 
difference between disputes involving particulars, or particular cases, and universals, or 
general problems.  In the particular examples, Gaut looks at situations where one is 
wondering “whether it is wrong to break a promise I yesterday made to Jack in order to 
help needy Jill.”96  In a situation like this the pluralist seems to be much worse off than 
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the consequentialist because the pluralist holds that both of the principles that come into 
play in this situation are relevant and neither can be decided on over the other according 
to Gaut.  The consequentialist at least only has one principle to rely on and therefore will 
not end up in a situation where they do not know what the theory would tell them to do.  
This appearance of being unable to solve the dilemma is actually, according to Gaut, just 
an appearance.  In a situation where a moral dilemma exists the moral pluralist will say 
that we should “cultivate moral experience and the capacities of moral reflection in 
oneself, and also to inquire of those who possess such experience and reflection what 
ought to be done…at certain points appeal has to be made to judges, not to principles.”97  
It is therefore possible for the moral pluralist to solve moral dilemmas in particular 
situations. 
 The situation with the pluralist attempting to solve universal or general problems 
is slightly different, according to Gaut.  Gaut examines the problem raised by Hooker 
surrounding universals, specifically the problems with rejecting principles such as the 
chastity principle and the problem surrounding euthanasia as the following: “Hooker 
believes in effect that either the pluralist must be a moral conservative, supporting 
whatever principles happen to be accepted by her society, or if she is to find good reasons 
for their modification, her position is in danger of collapsing into rule-
consequentialism.”98 
With the euthanasia example Hooker uses, the main problem is that if the pluralist 
appeals to what would be likely to produce the most overall good to make their decision 
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regarding what to do, he/she is considered a rule-consequentialist.  What is actually the 
case though is that the pluralist is appealing to the consequences of the situation as one of 
many relevant moral criteria for judgment.  The consequences of a situation are “a part of 
the normal argumentative strategies employed in common-sense morality.  But what the 
rule-consequentialist holds to be the only ultimate moral criterion for the acceptability of 
a rule, the pluralist can think of as a moral criterion for its acceptability.”99  In addition to 
this information, Gaut also mentions that it is possible for a pluralist to agree to or argue 
about a change in the meaning of the duty of non-maleficence; something Hooker does 
not believe is possible because of the danger of the theory collapsing back into rule-
consequentialism.  Even if Hooker is correct in his thinking that there are times where a 
duty should be modified in order to produce more good this, according to Gaut, does not 
make the theory collapse into rule-consequentialism because, as we just mentioned, 
consequences are relevant to the situation we are judging, but they are one of many 
considerations, not the only one. 
 In response to Hooker’s principle of chastity problem, Gaut agrees that the 
pluralist cannot appeal to any potential conflicts there might be with the principle of 
beneficence but disagrees with Hooker’s statement that the pluralist cannot say the 
principle is simply ungrounded.  When Hooker says this cannot happen, it is because the 
entire pluralist system rests on the idea that there is no grounding for any of the principles 
it uses.  This would make the principle of chastity no different from the others.  Gaut 
reminds us, as we saw in Chapter 2, that the principles can in fact “be grounded or 
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undermined by use of reflective equilibrium.”100  He claims that it is possible for the 
pluralist to undermine the principle of chastity by using the same reflective equilibrium 
process that was previously used to determine which moral principles will be included in 
the list of prima facie duties.  After careful consideration of the principle and the possible 
reasons why someone could accept it or reject it as well as whether or not the reasons can 
be empirically held up and respect the relationships we have with others, Gaut comes to 
the conclusion that a pluralist has many things they could claim in order to reject the 
principle of chastity.  “Some of these considerations appeal to the consequences of 
adopting the chastity rule, but others appeal to consistency with other principles we 
implicitly accept (such as that one ought not to restrict someone’s liberty without good 
reason), and to values we acknowledge (such as the value of romantic love).”101  There is 
therefore a way for the pluralist to argue about the principle of chastity even though 
Hooker thought that it was impossible. 
 
How Gaut’s Solution Only Solves Part of the Problem 
 
 In his attempt to fully refute the arguments Hooker has presented against moral 
pluralism, Gaut gives an explanation of how, regardless of the type of moral dilemma, 
moral pluralists are able to resolve the issue.  Gaut breaks moral dilemmas down into two 
types, those regarding particular situations (Hooker’s euthanasia example), and those 
regarding universal or general situations (Hooker’s chastity principle example).  He gives 
a fair defense of problems regarding universals by explaining that, while it is true that the 
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pluralist cannot reject the principle of chastity because it might potentially conflict with 
beneficence, the pluralist is able to appeal to the idea that the principle is ungrounded.  
The pluralist can make this appeal because of the fact that the moral principles that 
comprise moral pluralism are in fact grounded in reflective equilibrium.  Unless the 
principle of chastity can survive this process, and there are many possible ways in which 
it can both survive and/or fail, it will not be considered a principle that we need to follow. 
 The ease with which Gaut is able to solve the moral dilemma surrounding general 
situations does not carry over to his attempt at solving moral dilemmas regarding 
particular situations.  In attempting to solve problems such as whether or not the pluralist 
should allow euthanasia in particular situations, Gaut begins to refer to ideas like “the 
inability to resolve a dispute…may be the result of a genuine indeterminacy about what 
morally ought to be done in the case of certain moral problems”102 and that we should 
“inquire of those who possess such experience and reflection what ought to be done.”103  
The fact that a dispute may just be unable to be solved is something that Ross 
acknowledges but it is not something that he thinks will happen everyday.  Using this as a 
way out of the problem Hooker has raised will not work because there are situations 
which lead us to moral dilemmas which, it seems, must have some sort of solution.  Any 
example of a moral dilemma can be used here because we have, within our common-
sense morality, the idea that there is always some action that would be better for us to 
take than others.  What prevents us from taking the action the majority of the time is not 
the act itself (although I do acknowledge that it is the case that the weight or intimidation 
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of the act itself can prevent us from doing it automatically) but something other than the 
act in question such as fear of retribution or failure.  As a part of Ross’ theory we cannot 
just throw up our hands at the first sign of a moral dilemma saying that it cannot be 
solved.  In the words of Hooker, a better theory would give us that something extra, 
something more with which to solve these moral disputes.  This idea that some moral 
dilemmas cannot be solved also seems to be very uncharacteristic for Gaut.  Throughout 
his article he pushes the idea of how wonderful reflective equilibrium, the process of 
constant evaluation and reevaluation, is and how it enables us to escape the binds of a 
first principle as well as general dilemmas.  In the next section we will see how it may be 
possible for reflective equilibrium to do this something extra we are looking for here as 
well. 
 Gaut’s second response to the particular situation problem is that if we are in a 
moral dilemma we should refer back to “judges, not to principles”104 and ask those who 
have experience in situations which action we should take.  This solution not only makes 
Ross’ theory much less determinate than rule-consequentialism but also does not cohere 
with Ross’ theory, the nature of our relationships, the situations we find ourselves in, and 
the prima facie duties.  One of the benefits of having prima facie duties on which to make 
our decisions is that in using them, rather than just one moral principle as other ethical 
theories would, we are able to take into account every relevant aspect of a situation.  
Nothing pertinent gets left out.  We are also able to better develop our ability to gain 
knowledge and virtue, two of Ross’ intrinsic goods.  If we start relying on what experts or 
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people we know have done in past situations like ours we may neglect an aspect of the 
situation that is not only relevant but also a potential way to solve the dispute.  Friends 
and experts are also human beings just like us.  They are not infallible.  There is no 
reason to base decision making in situations that are moral dilemmas on people who are 
not in the situation we are trying to decipher, and who even if they have been in a similar 
situation to ours, may not have done what they were morally obliged to do, the morally 
right action.  While we may be in many different relationships with people in our lives, 
when it comes to our own actions, assuming we are of sound mind and in full capacity of 
our mental capabilities, we are not in a relationship with an other who is our decision-
maker while we are merely action-takers.  We must take part in the decision making 
process in order to sufficiently judge whether or not we should partake in a specific 
action.  Ross’ main criticism of other theories were that they “do not do full justice to the 
highly personal character of duty.”105  Adding in this idea of turning to experts for help, 
as Gaut does, is exactly the opposite of what Ross thinks right judgment is and how it 
should take place. 
 
A Solution to the Moral Dilemma Problem 
 
 After having examined two potential solutions to the problem Hooker raised 
regarding moral dilemmas, we find that while we have a way to solve dilemmas about 
general principles, such as the chastity principle, we have not found a way of solving 
moral dilemmas concerning particular situations.  McNaughton attempts to solve the 
problem by saying that, while Ross tries to solve this problem by using the different 
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weights the prima facie duties can have, Ross is mistaken in using them because they are 
not always evident, and so we are left with only being able to look at the situation and 
“form a reasonable judgment as to which duty (or duties) carry the most weight.”106  Gaut 
tries to solve the problem by saying that in particular situations of moral dilemmas we 
should look to the experts and people who have been in our situation before to help us 
determine the right course of action.  He adds to this that it is possible a moral dilemma is 
unsolvable and truly a dilemma.  As was explained previously in this chapter, both of 
these attempts at solving the moral dilemma problem are insufficient.  In order to truly 
solve this problem Hooker has raised we must once again consider something 
McNaughton mentioned in his article. 
 At the point in his article when he has given up on the possibility of some of the 
duties naturally having more stringency than others in every situation, he throws up his 
hands and tells us that the only thing we can do is use our capacity to judge and make an 
attempt at deciding which of the prima facie duties is most stringent in that specific 
situation and then performing the action that prima facie duty prescribes.  This act of 
using moral judgment and looking at the situation is exactly what Ross prescribed we do 
in a situation where we are not immediately able to see which course of action is morally 
right.  It is a far cry from the last-ditch effort McNaughton seems to want to make it.  
When the euthanasia case that Hooker uses is taken into account, though, this very simple 
way of deciding which of two actions to take is no longer so simple.  As we have seen in 
Hooker, opponents may think that moral pluralism is simply unable to solve problems 
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like these.  Any true attempt will fall into rule-consequentialism or violate another aspect 
of moral pluralism.  The moral pluralist is still left trying to decide what to do in highly 
complicated moral dilemmas. 
 If we take a look back at what Ross initially says in The Right and the Good we 
will see that he has already thought about this problem and answered it in his usual 
fashion.  “Where a possible act is seen to have two characteristics, in virtue of one of 
which it is prima facie right, and in virtue of the other prima facie wrong, we are (I think) 
well aware that we are not certain whether we ought or ought not to do it; that whether 
we do it or not, we are taking a moral risk.  We come in the long run, after consideration, 
to think that one duty is more pressing than the other, but we do not feel certain that it is 
so.”107  It is in this way that both McNaughton and Gaut had something right about how 
we are supposed to try and solve moral dilemmas of the particular kind.  McNaughton 
was correct in stating that we must use our judgment to decide what we should do, and 
Gaut was correct in seeing that some moral dilemmas really cannot be solved to the 
degree we would like them to be.  All that we can do in situations like Hooker’s 
euthanasia example is look at the facts and try to fully understand the situation.  Once we 
have achieved this, we can look at these facts as they relate to the prima facie duties and, 
if we are in full capacity of our mental capabilities and have in fact been able to see the 
entirety of the situation, we can make a the correct decision regarding how we should act.  
It is possible for us to reason incorrectly and do the morally wrong action because we 
were lapse in our judgment, are not as mentally developed as we should be for some 
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reason, or did not have all of the facts readily available to us at the time we had to make 
the decision but, although this act is morally wrong, it is still morally good because it 
came from good motives. 
Because, in the euthanasia case, we are not sure of the moral weight of either 
letting the person die or keeping them alive, we end up with a situation where neither act 
is morally obligatory in Ross’ view.  What now is the case is that the act of taking either 
action is what is morally right.  We generally cannot be obliged to take both actions 
because in situations such as the euthanasia example, the two actions involve 
contradictory events occurring, life and death.  With this in mind we are obliged by 
morality (as well as potentially by society) to take up one of the two actions available and 
not just throw our hands in the air and walk away as Gaut and McNaughton seem to 
suggest.  Which action we take is up for us to decide.  As long as we have given 
sufficient thought to the situation, as described above, whatever we do will be morally 
good.  Rather than being obligated to do one of the two acts over the other, we are simply 
obligated to do one of the acts, either one.  Of course, once the action is taken, we are 
then released from this special situation.  At this point we now have to look back on the 
situation and be sure we don’t have a duty of reparation owed to anyone because of any 
of the other duties that were potentially overridden because of our course of action or 
because of the effects our action produced. 
In light of the information just provided we can see that it is possible for the 
pluralist to respond to the objection raised by Hooker regarding moral dilemmas.  While 
it might not be as clear cut a solution as rule-consequentialism claims to have when it 
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comes to solving moral disputes, it is a solution in keeping with the general ideas of 
moral pluralism.  Also it is possible that Ross’ moral pluralism, while relying on 
individual judgment to decide courses of action, will be more accurate in directing people 
towards the morally right action than rule-consequentialism.  This is something Hooker 
cannot ignore.  Moral pluralism lives to see another day. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
 Now that we have thoroughly examined W. D. Ross’ moral pluralism as well as 
possible objections to the theory raised by Hooker I think that we can say that moral 
pluralism is a theory that can stand on its own two feet against the many monist theories 
that exist.  With the problems Hooker has raised for moral pluralism solved as well as 
Gaut’s examination of whether it is actually possible for rule-consequentialism to match 
our intuitions as well as moral pluralism, I believe it is safe to say that moral pluralism is 
a much better match for our intuitions than rule-consequentialism and that it does not fall 
into any of the problems that Hooker thinks it does.  Moral pluralism is on the whole a 
theory that is much more reflective of our intuitions than rule-consequentialism (and 
possibly every other moral theory) and it can do everything not only that rule-
consequentialism can do but also what we believe a moral theory should be able to do.
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